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Hodges: Modernizing Disability Income for Cancer Survivors

ARTICLES
MODERNIZING DISABILITY INCOME FOR CANCER SURVIVORS

Ann C. Hodges*
I. INTRODUCTION
The medical progress in cancer treatment is worthy of celebration, as
survivors of many cancers are living longer. That is the good news. The
bad news is the financial impact of cancer is devastating for many survivors, particularly those who have lengthy periods of unemployment as a
result of cancer and its life-saving treatment. Empirical research has
demonstrated the adverse effects of cancer on employment.
The law has not kept up with medical developments, to the detriment
of cancer survivors. While employment laws provide some protection, as
demonstrated in my earlier research changes in the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") could
make a real difference for survivors attempting to maintain employment. 1
Yet preventing discrimination and accommodating the limitations of cancer survivors is not enough. 2
While the recommended changes will help many survivors remain
employed, for some survivors, disability will require a significant period
of unemployment or partial employment. Disability income provides
some hope for avoiding financial disaster for those survivors unable to
• Professor of Law Emerita, University of Richmond and a co-founder ofCancerLINC, a nonprofit
organization that provides information, education and referral to legal resources, financial guidance,
and community services for individuals with cancer. The author wishes to thank Megan Donovan,
J.D. 2016, Milena Radovic, J.D. 2016, Lisa Allen, J.D. 2018,, Victoria Zicker, J.D. 2018 and Mollie
Laird, Class of 2019 for valuable research assistance. She also thanks her colleagues at the University
of Richmond and Professor Barbara Hoffman, Rutgers Law School, a founder of the National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship, for feedback at various stages of the preparation of the article.
1.
See Ann C. Hodges, Working with Cancer: How the Law Can Help Survivors Maintain
Employment, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2015).
2.
Professor Bagenstos has made this observation with respect to individuals with disability
generally. See SAMUEL BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 136 (2009).
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work. 3 Like the ADA and the FMLA, however, the disability income sys4
tem needs revision to accommodate the needs of cancer survivors. As
the second phase of this project, this article will analyze current systems
available for disability income, recommending changes to better meet the
needs of cancer survivors.
The analysis begins in Section II with the research on the determinants of cancer survivors' employment, looking at the length and scope
of survivors' disability. Next, Section III assesses the financial impact of
cancer. Section IV looks at the laws providing public disability income,
both federal and state. Following the analysis of public disability programs, the article moves to private disability insurance, surveying the
prevalence of private disability income coverage, the scope of available
disability income, and the laws relating to private disability income. Section V assesses the utility of the existing disability income system for cancer survivors. Finally, Section VI makes recommendations for change in
the current system. The ideal solution would reform the Social Security
system to expand disability income with an insurance mandate that would
come with a less stringent definition of disability than currently applies.
The changes would be combined with extensive efforts at rehabilitation
and accommodation to try to maintain employment over the long term and
shrink disability rolls. Should amending the Social Security system prove
impossible, an alternative is for states to adopt public programs that provide temporary total and partial disability benefits, similar to those that
exist in five states currently. Both changes would improve current disability income for survivors and reduce the financial stresses and disasters
that often accompany a cancer diagnosis
IL CANCER SURVIVORS, EMPLOYMENT, AND DISABILITY
Cancer survivors are more likely to be unemployed than individuals
with no history of cancer. 5 Cancer affects employment more significantly

Professor, now Senator, Elizabeth Warren pointed out the importance of disability insur3.
ance for cancer survivors in 2004, noting that the combination of medical bills and loss of income
could be disastrous for families, often leading to bankruptcy. Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics
of the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. I, 37-38 (2004).
Id. at 38.
4.
5. Angela G.E.M. De Boer et al., Cancer Survivors and Unemployment, a Meta-analysis and
Meta-regression, 301 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 753, 760 (2009) (finding cancer survivors 1.37 times more
likely to be unemployed than control group); Anja Mehnert, Employment and Work-Related Issues in
Cancer Survivors, 77 CRITICAL REV. IN ONOC0L0GYIHEMATOLOGY 109, 122 (2011) {discussing
meta-analysis of 64 studies finding that cancer survivors had lower rates of employment which increased over time, resulting in, on average, 63.5% of survivors returning to work); Richard J. Butler
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than other serious medical issues. 6 The most severe impact on employment occurs in the year after diagnosis, 7 but many cancer survivors have
some residual disability that affects their ability to work over the long
term; some for months and others for years. 8 Survivors who continue to
work, often work fewer hours. 9 While some reduced employment may
et al., Economic Burden, WORK AND CANCER SURVNORS 25, 59, 67 (Michael Feuerstein ed., 2009)
(finding that "cancer survivors on average never fully recover to their pre-cancer levels of employment" and specifically that the employment rate of colon cancer survivors is 20% lower than others
of similar age).
6. See INST. OF MED. & NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, FROM CANCER PATIENT TO CANCER
SURVNOR: LoST IN TRANSITION 370-71 (Maria Hewitt et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter "IOM Report"].
7. See Cathy J. Bradley, Absenteeism From Work: The Experience of Employed Breast and
Prostate Cancer Patients in the Months Following Diagnosis, 15 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 739, 739-40
(2006) [hereinafter Absenteeism] (finding thirty percent of breast and prostate cancer patients who
were working prior to diagnosis were not working six months after diagnosis and those who continued
to work worked fewer hours); Cathy J. Bradley et al., Employment and Cancer: Findings From a
Longitudinal Study ofBreast and Prostate Cancer Survivors, 25 CANCER INvESTIGATION 47, 49- 52
(2007) [hereinafter Employment and Cancer] (finding breast and prostate cancer survivors were less
likely to be employed six months after diagnosis but that at twelve and eighteen months after diagnosis, many had returned to work and employment was not lower than in a control group); Come A.
Roelen et al., Sickness Absence and Full Return to Work After Cancer: 2-Year Follow-up ofRegister
Data/or Different Cancer Sites, 20 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY JOO!, 1001 (2011) (finding 73% of cancer
survivors working before diagnosis fully returned to work after a median duration of290 days); Pamela Farley Short et al., Employment Pathways in a Large Cohort of Adult Cancer Survivors, 103
CANCER 1292, 1296 (2005) (finding that most survivors who stopped working during treatment returned to work within a year of diagnosis).
8. See Employment and Cancer, supra note 7, at 50 (finding that although many cancer survivors had returned to work at twelve months after diagnosis, cancer interfered with various physical
and cognitive work tasks); Cathy J. Bradley & Heather L. Bednarek, Employment Patterns o/LongTerm Cancer Survivors, 11 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 188, 193 (2002) (finding that 67% of survivors working at diagnosis were working five to seven years later but that 24% percent of survivors of lung,
colorectal, breast, and prostate cancer who were not working five to seven years later stopped working
because of poor health or disability); de Boer et al., supra note 5, at 761 (finding in meta-analysis
both higher rates of disability among cancer survivors as compared to control group and long term
effects on ability to work, capacity to work and earnings); Sung-Hee Jeon, The Long-Term Effects of
Cancer on Employment and Earnings, 26 HEALTH ECON. 671, 683 (May 2017) (finding that cancer
lowers the probability of working by 5% in the third year after diagnosis); Kathleen Oberst et al.,
Work Task Disability in Employed Breast and Prostate Cancer Patients, 4 J. CANCER SURVNORSHIP
322, 326 (2010) (finding cancer-related disability rates in breast and prostate cancer survivors declining over time but still present for some patients eighteen months after diagnosis and negatively related
to employment); Roelen et al., supra note 7, at 1001 (finding that within two years of diagnosis, most
had returned to work); Yakir Rottenberg et al., Unemployment Risk 2 Years and 4 Years Following
Gastric Cancer Diagnosis, 11 J. CANCER SURVNORSHIP 119, 119 (Feb. 2017) (finding increased risk
of unemployment for Israeli gastric cancer survivors two years after diagnosis); Short et al., supra
note 7, at 1293-96 (finding that 20% of survivors in cohort of 1433 reported some residual disability
and 11 % of survivors who returned to work after treatment left work for cancer-related reasons in the
next three years while nine percent of survivors who worked through treatment left work for cancerrelated reasons within four years of diagnosis).
9.
See Absenteeism, supra note 7, at 739-40 (finding breast and prostate cancer survivors
working six months after diagnosis worked fewer hours); Cathy J. Bradley et al. Short-Term Effects
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result from choice, 10 it is clear that residual disability also impacts the
ability to work. 11 There are a variety of effects of cancer and cancer treatment that may limit the ability to work including: the immune suppression
effects of certain therapies that require avoiding close contact with people
who might carry infectious bacteria; physical limitations, such as difficulty speaking, lifting, walking, or standing; cognitive or other mental
limitations due to either brain cancers, metastases, or chemotherapy effects; depression; and fatigue. 12
Certain demographic factors are associated with reduced

of Breast Cancer on Labor Market Attachment: Results From a Longitudinal Study, 24 J. HEALTH
ECON. 137, §§ 139, 153-55 (2005) [hereinafter Short-Term Effects] (finding that women with breast
cancer who continued to work after diagnosis worked fewer hours than the control group); Mehnert,
supra note 5, at 124 (finding most studies in meta-analysis that analyzed work hours showed reduction
in hours by cancer survivors); John R. Moran et al., Long-Term Employment Effects of Surviving
Cancer, 30 J. HEALTH ECON. 505, 509-10 (2011) (finding that two to six years after diagnosis cancer
survivors of prime working age were less likely to work full time and working fewer hours per week
than a comparison group with no history of cancer); John F. Steiner, The Impact of Physical and
Psychosocial Factors on Work Characteristics After Cancer, 17 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 138, 140-42
(2008) (finding physical and psychological symptoms caused reduced work hours). But see Cathy J.
Bradley et al., Breast Cancer and Women's Labor Supply, 37 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1309, 1320-23
(2002) [hereinafter Breast Cancer and Women's Labor] (finding that women working after a breast
cancer diagnosis work more hours per week than those without breast cancer). Researchers hypothesized that the increase in hours might reflect an effort to recover savings depleted by treatment or a
renewed commitment to work as a result of the cancer. Id. at 1325.
As a result of cancer, some survivors change their preferences for work and leisure, pre10.
ferring more of the latter and less of the former, although this option is only available to those who
can afford to reduce work. See INST. OF MED., & NAT'L RES. COUNCIL supra note 6, at 364; Corine
Tiedtke et al., Experiences and Concerns About 'Returning to Work'for Women Breast Cancer Survivors: A Literature Review, 19 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 677, 681 (2010) (meta-analysis of six studies
from three countries).
Steiner, supra note 9, at 140-41.
11.
12. See Donatus U. Ekwueme et al., Medical Costs and Productivity Losses of Cancer Survivors-United States, 2008-2011, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 505, 507 (2014); Guy
Maytal & John Peteet, The Meaning of Work in WORK AND CANCER SURVIVORS 105, 115 (Michael
Feuerstein, ed. 2009).
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employment for cancer survivors. Low income workers, 13 rural workers, 14 Latinos, 15 and African-American workers 16 are less likely to continue working after a cancer diagnosis. Some part of the explanation is
the prevalence of physical work among these groups, but the type of work
does not fully explain the difference in employment. 17
In sum, while many survivors are unemployed for less than a year,
others suffer unemployment much longer. And those who do work often
13. Victoria Blinder et al., Women With Breast Cancer Who Work For Accommodating Employers More Likely To Retain Jobs After Treatment, 36 HEALTH AFF. 274, 277 (2017) [hereinafter
Women with Breast Cancer] (finding lower income workers were less likely to have accommodating
employers and less likely to retain employment after a breast cancer diagnosis); Reynard R.
Bouknight et al., Correlates of Return to Work for Breast Cancer Survivors, 24 J. CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 345,347 (2006); Mehnert, supra note 5, at 123 (finding a number of studies showing both
lower income and manual labor associated with reduced likelihood of employment); Victoria S.
Blinder et al., Return to Work in Low-Income Latina and Non-Latina White Breast Cancer Survivors:
A 3-Year Longitudinal Study, 118 CANCER 1664, 1671 (2012) [hereinafter Return to Work] (finding
that low income survivors of various ethnicities did not have the same rates of return to work as higher
income white survivors); Steiner, supra note 9, at 145. See also Jeon, supra note 8, at 682 (finding
that low income cancer survivors and survivors with less than a high school education are less likely
to be working than cancer survivors as a whole).
14. See Michelle Sowden et al., The Impact of Cancer Diagnosis on Employment: Is There a
Difference Between Rural and Urban Populations?, 8 J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 213, 216-17 (2014)
(finding more rural survivors than urban survivors take early retirement after a cancer diagnosis).
15. Return to Work, supra note 13, at 1664, 1667 (finding Latinas less likely to be employed
at six and eighteen months following a breast cancer diagnosis than non-Latinas of similar income
levels); Mahasin S. Mujahid et al., Racial/Ethnic Differences in Job Loss for Women with Breast
Cancer, 5 J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 102, 106 (2009) (finding Latina women more likely to be unemployed than non-Latina white women after a breast cancer diagnosis).
16. Bouknight et al., supra note 13, at 348, 351; Cathy J. Bradley & Amber Wilk, Racial
Differences in Quality of Life and Employment Outcomes in Insured Women With Breast Cancer, 8
J. CANCER SURVIVORSHIP 49, 51, 58 (2014) (finding significant reduced employment among AfricanAmerican women after a diagnosis of cancer as compared to non-Hispanic white women after controlling for many job characteristics and insurance, leading to supposition that differences in treatment
regimen or symptom control might explain the difference);Employment and Cancer, supra note 7, at
49; Michael J. Hassett et al., Factors Influencing Changes in Employment Among Women with Newly
Diagnosed Breast Cancer, 115 CANCER 2775, 2775 (2009); Robin L. Whitney, et al., Work and Financial Disparities Among Adult Cancer Survivors in the United States, 32 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY
Abstract 238 (2014), available at http://meetinglibrary.asco.org/content/137778-153 (finding
nonwhite cancer survivors are more likely to require work modifications, defined as changing to a
more flexible schedule or a less difficult job; early retirement or delayed retirement; or a prolonged
and/or unpaid leave of absence). Another study found no statistically significant difference between
white and African-American women in job loss following cancer 11fter controlling for other sociodemographic factors, however. Mujahid, et al., supra note 15, at 106-108.
17. See Oberst et al., supra note 8, at 323, 326-327 (finding significant percentages of survivors with physical jobs had physical disabilities at twelve and eighteen months following diagnosis
and were less likely to be working than those without such disabilities); see also Return to Work,
supra note 13, at 1669, 1672 (finding that physical jobs only partially explained the employment
difference between low income Latina and non-Latina survivors); see also Women with Breast Cancer, supra note 13, at 274-75, (positing that less accommodating employers might cause lower employment rates for low income women with breast cancer).
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work fewer hours as a result of disability related to cancer. This limited
ability to work, leading to reduced income, necessarily creates a financial
impact on cancer survivors and their families.
III. THE FJNANCIAL IMP ACT OF CANCER

Cancer is expensive. The cost of cancer includes not only the cost
of care and treatment but also lost productivity and for individuals, lost
income. 18 Cancer is among the most expensive health conditions for
adults over 18. 19 In 2012, for adults age eighteen to sixty-four, cancer had
the highest per person expenditure. 20 The estimate for the total direct cost
of cancer care for 2014 is $87.8 billion.2 1 The direct cost of cancer care
is estimated to be between $157.77 and $172.77 billion in 2020, depending on the rate of health care cost increase. 22 According to estimates, the
indirect costs, such as lost productivity, significantly exceed the direct
costs of cancer. 23
Billions of work days are lost or affected by cancer. 24 Additionally,
employees may be deterred from job changes because of fears about the
impact on health insurance, an economically inefficient result that prevents the best use of employee talents. 25 The financial impact on society

18.
See infra notes 19-24.
19.
Anita Soni, Statistical Brief#471, Top Five Most Costly Conditions Among Adults Age
18 and Older, 20 I 2: Estimates for the U.S. Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (Apr. 2015),
https://meps.ahrq .gov/data_files/publications/st4 71/stat471.shtml.
Id.
20.
21.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY,
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey: Table 3: Total Expenses and Percent Distribution for Selected
of
Service:
United
States,
2014,
available
at
Conditions
by
Type
https://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/tables_compendia_hh_ interactive.jsp?_ SERVICE=MEPSSocketO&_pROGRAM=MEPSPGM.TC.SAS&File=HCFY2014&Table
=HCFY2014_CNDXP_C&_Debug= (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
22. Angela B. Mariotto et al., Projections of the Cost of Cancer Care in the United States:
2010-2020, 103 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 117, 122 (2011).
23· MICHAEL P. MARKOWSKI, THREE ESSAYS ON CANCER SURVIVORSIDP AND LABOR
SUPPLY 7 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University) (on file with
author) (citing National Institutes of Health estimates that place the cost of lost productivity at more
than half the total cost of cancer); Richard J. Butler et al., Economic Burden, WORK AND CANCER
SURVIVORS 25, 69 (Michael Feuerstein ed., 2009) (finding that productivity losses from cancer were
twice the direct cost of cancer treatment).
24· MARKOWSKI, supra note 23, at 7.
25. STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN W. BUDD, INv!SIBLE HANDS, INVISIBLE OBJECTIVES:
BRINGING WORKPLACE LAW AND PuBLIC POLICY INTO FOCUS 60 (2009) (describing the deterrent
effect of fear of loss of health insurance coverage in general as a "market failure that decreases the
efficiency of the U.S. economy").
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is substantial. 26 The financial impact on individuals and their families is
often devastating. 27 As stated by the Leukemia and Lymphoma Society,
"'[f]inancial toxicity' has become as threatening to patient quality of life
as the actual diseases and conditions that patients are battling on the clinical front. " 28
Loss of income due to illness is a major contributor to bankruptcy in
the United States. 29 Individuals undergoing cancer treatment exhaust
26. MARKOWSKI, supra note 23, at 7.
27.
Jessica H. Banthin & Didem M Bernard, Changes in Financial Burdens for Health Care,
296 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2712, 2714 (Dec. 13, 2006) (finding those with cancer more likely to face
significant financial burdens for health care costs); Jeon, supra note 8, at 683 (finding an average
earnings loss for cancer survivors of 12% in the first year after diagnosis); Maurie Markman & Ryan
Luce, Impact of the Cost of Cancer Treatment: An Internet-Based Survey, 6 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 69,
70 (2010) (reporting on survey results of survivors in which 16% said their health plan paid less than
expected, 12% said they had paid between $10,000 and $25,000 in out of pocket costs, and 4% said
they had spent between $25,000 and $50,000. Two percent incurred between $50,000 and $100,000
and another 2% more than $100,000 in out of pocket costs); Karyn Schwartz et al, Spending to Survive: Cancer Patients Confront Holes in the Health Insurance System (KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION
& AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY 2009), available at https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7851.pdf (reporting on survivors, most insured, who have faced high costs in the
health care system as a result of cancer, incurring debt, deferring tests and treatment, not taking medications, filing bankruptcy, cashing in retirement accounts, and facing collection lawsuits.) The stories in the Kaiser report preceded the enactment of the Affordable Care Act so some of the gaps
identified have been filled, but high health care costs remain a problem for many. Leukemia and
Lymphoma Society, Honoring Our Commitment To Cures and Access: The Leukemia and Lymphoma
Society is on the Side ofPatients, http://www.lls.org/cancercost/Position_Statement, (last visited Apr.
12, 2018) (reporting that in 2016 the Leukemia and Lymphoma Society received 26,000 calls to its
free information hotline, with the majority reporting financial stress and difficulties accessing treatment); Veena Shankaran et al., Risk Factors for Financial Hardship in Patients Receiving Adjuvant
Chemotherapy for Colon Cancer: A Population-Based Exploratory Analysis, 30 J. CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 1608, 1610, 1611 (2012) (finding 38% of patients with similar treatment regimens reported at least one financial hardship related to treatment and those not reporting financial hardship
had other financial effects such as selling investments, spending savings or retirement funds, or having
reduced income of less than 20% because of treatment. Further 31 % of respondents indicated the
financial burden of cancer was high or very high); S. Yousuf Zafar et al., The Financial Toxicity of
Cancer Treatment: A Pilot Study Assessing Out-of-Pocket Expenses and the Insured Cancer Patient's
Experience, 18 ONCOLOGIST 381,383 (2013) (finding 42% of insured patients in study reported significant or catastrophic financial problems from out-of-pocket expenses. They cut spending on leisure
activities (68%) and food and clothing (46%), used savings (46%) and sold possessions (17%) to pay
cancer-related expenses).
28. Leukemia and Lymphoma Society, Reducing the Cost of Cancer Care: Policy Recommendations from the Leukemia and Lymphoma Society, http://www.lls.org/cancercost/Policy_Recommendations (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
29. David U. Hirnmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a
National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 741-44 (2009), available at http://www.amjmed.com/article/
S0002-9343%2809%2900404-5/fulltext?refuid=S0002-9343%2809%2900525-7&refissn=00029343 (finding that sixty-two percent of bankruptcies in 2007 were caused by medical reasons, including significant medical costs, loss of income, and/or mortgaging a home to pay medical bills). The
study found that most of the debtors were middle class, well-educated and homeowners and most had
health insurance at the beginning of their illness. Id. More than a third of the families impacted
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savings, incur debt, and soon face bill collectors. 30 A cancer diagnosis
significantly increases the likelihood of both bankruptcy 31 and home foreclosure. 32 It is not only the individual who is affected, but also families,
creditors, neighbors, and communities. And the economic hardships for
cancer survivors linger. In one study, almost half of survivors reported
difficulties in paying for life's necessities with existing income a year after diagnosis. 33
Additionally, the impact of these financial challenges can create a
vicious cycle, impairing the ability to comply with treatment and threatening recovery, which in tum exacerbates financial problems. Financial
problems cause anxiety and stress, interfering with the ability to comply
with prescribed treatment regimens. 34 Patients may delay filling needed
suffered job loss, either the patient or a caregiver. Id.
Jennifer Mellace, The Financial Burden of Cancer Care, SOCIAL WORK TODAY, Vol. 10,
30.
No. 2, at p. 14 (Mar.IApr. 2010) (reporting on survey of cancer patients, caregivers and oncology
social workers showing that 40% of survivors indicated that they depleted savings and nearly 30%
indicated they were contacted by collections agencies); Shankaran, et al., supra note 27, at 1610 (indicating 23% of patients in study reported debt resulting from cancer treatment expenses, with average
debt of $26,380).
Scott Ramsey et al., Washington State Cancer Patients Found To Be at Greater Risk of
31.
Bankruptcy Than People Without a Cancer Diagnosis, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1143, 1143 (2013) (finding
that cancer patients were 2.65 times more likely to file for bankruptcy than those without cancer and
younger patients were more likely to file than older patients, perhaps because the latter had access to
Social Security and Medicare benefits). Of course, it is not only cancer that leads to bankruptcy. The
Consumer Bankruptcy Project demonstrated that in 2007, almost two-thirds of bankruptcies resulted
from medical problems. Himmelstein et al. supra note 29, at 741. This was an increase of 48% over
medical bankruptcies in 2001. Id. at 744. Most of the medical bankruptcy filers were well-educated,
middle class and insured. Id. at 743. But see Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer
Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1518 (2005) ( criticizing the study's definitions of medical
bankruptcy and its conclusions about the scope and increase in medical bankruptcies).
32. Arpit Gupta et al., Leverage, Default, and Morality: Evidence From Cancer Diagnoses,
(Colum. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 514, Sept. 12, 2017), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2583975 (finding 65% increase in the likelihood of foreclosure in the five years post-diagnosis). Those with more advanced cancers had an even greater risk of foreclosure. Id. The authors found
that those with substantial equity in their homes did not have an increase in foreclosure rates, however.
Id. Like bankruptcy, foreclosures are often caused, at least in part, by medical problems in general.
Christopher Tarver Robertson et al., Get Sick, Get Out: The Medical Causes ofHome Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 68 (2008) (finding that seven often respondents to survey of those
facing foreclosure reported a medical cause such as medical bills, lost work due to illness or injury,
using home equity to pay medical bills, or caring for an ill family member).
33. Maria Pisu et al., Economic Hardship of Minority and Non-Minority Cancer Survivors I
Year After Diagnosis: Another Long-term Effect of Cancer?, 121 CANCER 1257, 1257 (2015).
34. Kathleen M. Fenn et al., Impact of Financial Burden of Cancer On Survivors' Quality of
Life, 10 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 332 (2014) (finding financial difficulties associated with cancer to be a
significant predictor of quality of life); Markman & Luce, supra note 27, at 70 (finding that 19% of
survivors completing the survey indicated that the cost of treatment had caused significant distress,
with 25% oflung and colon cancer survivors and 39% of families with an income of less than $40,000
so reporting); Mellace, supra note 30, at 14 (reporting on survey results indicating that 66% of cancer
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prescriptions or skip doses of medication to save money. 35 They may delay or avoid other treatment for financial reasons. 36
A cross-national study of the relationship between unemployment
rates and cancer confirms the significant impact - increasing unemployment in developed countries is associated with higher mortality rates
among cancer patients. 37 The association persisted for five years after an
increase in unemployment. 38 Because the association related to treatable
cancers and was eliminated with implementation of universal health care
coverage, the authors posited that reduced access to health care was a primary explanation. 39 Further, the mental health effects of job loss may
impact treatment compliance. 40 While the unemployment rate includes
many who were unemployed at diagnosis, a high unemployment rate
makes it more difficult for cancer survivors to maintain employment or
obtain substitute employment. Additionally, the study provides further
evidence of the impact of financial difficulties on cancer survivors. 41
Not surprisingly, studies also show that financial difficulties are
more common for younger survivors, nonwhite survivors, lower income

patients with significant financial problems suffered from depression or anxiety and 55% said that
stress related to their financial difficulties adversely affected their ability to focus on recovery); Linda
Sharp et al., Associations Between Cancer-Related Financial Stress and Strain and Psychological
Well-Being Among Individuals Living with Cancer, 22 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 745, 745 (2013) (stating
30% of cancer survivors suffer from a psychological disorder and that financial problems related to
cancer were associated with increased depression, anxiety and stress in Irish survivors six and twelve
months after diagnosis); Michael A. Zevon et al., Medically Related Legal Needs and Quality ofLife
in Cancer Care, 109 CANCER 2600 (2007) (finding survivors identified legal needs relating to finances
and employment, including disability, as significantly related to quality of life).
35. Mellace, supra note 30, at 14 (reporting survey results showing that 29% of cancer patients
delayed filling prescriptions and 22% skipped medication, both for financial reasons); Zafar et al.,
supra note 27, at 383 (reporting on insured survey participants who skipped medications for financial
reasons-where 20% took less than prescribed, 19% only partially filled prescriptions, and 24% did
not fill prescriptions).
36. Markman & Luce, supra note 27, at 70, 71, 72 (indicating that 9% of survivors and 25%
of those with incomes less than $40,000 per year had declined treatment due to cost); Mellace, supra
note 30, at 14 (indicating 54% of patients in survey with significant financial issues found it more
difficult to afford treatment); Kathryn E. Weaver et al., Forgoing Medical Care Because of Cost, 116
CANCER 3493-3504 (2010) (finding cancer survivors more likely than others to forego all types of
medical care because of the cost); Zafar et al., supra note 27, at 383 (reporting on insured survey
participants who skipped appointments (4%), delayed appointments (7%) and declined procedures
(7%) or tests (9%) because of cost).
3 7. Mahiben Maruthappu et al., Economic Downturns, Universal Health Coverage and Cancer
Mortality in High-Income and Middle-Income Countries, 1990-2010: a Longitudinal Analysis, 388
THE LANCET 684,687 (2016).
38. Id. at 689.
39. Id. at 693.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 685; see also Shankaran et al., supra note 27, at 1612.
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survivors, survivors with either Medicaid or no health insurance, those
with more advanced cancers, and those who have some period of unemployment.42 As noted above, low income and nonwhite survivors are less
likely to work post-diagnosis, making financial difficulties more probable.
One way to minimize the impact of fmancial stress is to provide some
43
replacement income for individuals disabled by cancer. In addition to
44
paid leave, disability income offers an alternative for individuals unable
to work. The following section reviews the currently available sources of
disability income.

N.

CURRENT DISABILITY INCOME

45

Disability income may be provided through a public program, federal
or state, or a private plan. The latter might be provided through employment or purchased individually in the open market.

A. Public Disability Income
1. Federal Disability Income
46
Federal disability income is provided through two programs. One
Shankaran et al., supra note 27, at 1610 (finding financial difficulties associated with
42.
unemployment, lower income, nonwhite race, and Medicaid or no health insurance);
age,
younger
Ramsey et al., supra note 31, at 1145-46 (finding younger survivors more likely to file bankruptcy
than older ones); Whitney et al., supra note 16 (finding active treatment, absence of insurance,
nonwhite race/ethnicity and an age younger than sixty-five predicted financial difficulties among cancer survivors); Weaver et al., supra note 36, at 3495, 3498 (finding Hispanic and African-American
cancer survivors more likely to forego prescription medications and dental care due to cost while
Hispanics were more likely to go without all types of medical care than non-Hispanic whites); Pisu
et al., supra note 33, at 1264 (finding African-Americans and Hispanics more likely to report economic burdens than non-Hispanic whites, with some of the difference explained by general economic
status).
See Alena Allen, State-Mandated Disability Insurance as Salve to the Consumer Bank43.
ruptcy Imbroglio, 2011 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1327, 1359-60 (showing that states with mandatory disability
insurance are lower than the national average in bankruptcy filings).
See Hodges, supra note I, at 1078-79, 1104-06 (detailing existing laws providing for paid
44.
leave and recommending changes to increase the availability of paid leave).
The Social Security disability program officially denominates the payments as income,
45.
not benefits. See Umar Moulta-Ali, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32279, Primer on Disability Benefits: Social Security Disability Benefits (SSDI) and Social Security Income (SSI), at I (201 !).(using
the Supplemental Security Income program to describe benefits as income). I will use the term income because benefits suggest a gift while income suggests that the funds were earned or at least
deserved by virtue of the disability status. See id. (finding the goal of disability insurance is to replace
part ofa worker's income ifhe or she is prevented from working due to a disability).
Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY BENEFITS 4 (2017),
46.
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is Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), which is based on credits
earned through participation in covered employment. 47 As of November
2017, 8.71 million workers and 1.71 million dependents were receiving
benefits through the SSDI program.48 The other program is Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), which is paid based on income and assets regardless of prior employment. 49 As of November 2017, 8.22 million individuals were receiving income under the program, with 4.8 million between
the ages of eighteen and sixty-four. 50 Disability income under both programs is paid to individuals who cannot work at any job because of a condition that is expected to last at least a year or result in death. 51 To determine ability to work, the Social Security Administration (SSA) looks at
whether the person can work at his/her old job and whether the individual
can do any other job, considering qualifications and disability limitations. 52
Income is available only for long-term and complete disability. 53
Short-term disability lasting less than a year is not covered. 54 These requirements for SSDI reflect the underlying purpose of the payments: They
are a replacement of anticipated income from work for those unable to
work and not an alternative to employment. 55 Further they do not support
an employee who is unable to work at the prior employment level, whether
in terms of hours, income or qualifications. 56 Only complete inability to
work gamers benefits. 57 "[T]hose who can work must work." 58 Individuals with cancer that meet these requirements can get disability benefits if
they meet the other eligibility requirements for either program.

http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10029 .pdf (hereinafter "DISABILITY BENEFITS").
47. Moulta-Ali, supra note 45, at I.
48.
Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS: MONTHLY STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT,
Nov. 2017, tbl.2, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/index.html?qs#table2
(last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
49.
Moulta-Ali, supra note 45, at I.
50. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME RECIPIENTS: MONTHLY
STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT, Nov. 2017, tbl.3, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/index.html?qs - table3 (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
51. DISABILITY BENEFITS, supra note 46, at 1.
52. The actual determination is complex and involves multiple steps, slowing the process of
decisions on disability claims. Ken Matheny, The Social Security Disability Appeals Backlog Crisis
and the Necessity ofRadical Reform, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 361-70 (2017).
53.
DISABILITY BENEFITS, supra note 46, at 1.
54. Id.
55. Lance Liebman, The Definition ofDisability in Social Security and Supplemental Security
Income: Drawing the Bounds ofSocial Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833, 843 (1976).
56. See id. at 847-48.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 843.
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Eligibility for SSDI benefits is based on recent work and duration of
work, and the requirements depend on the age at which an individual
meets the definition of disability. Young workers, age 24 or less, must
59
have worked 1.5 of the three previous years. Between ages twenty-four
and thirty-one, an individual must have worked half the time between the
quarter after turning twenty-one and the quarter in which the person became disabled. 60 Those over thirty-one must have worked five of the previous ten years. 61 The duration of work requirement ranges from 1.5 to
62
9.5 years depending on the age of disability. There is a five month waiting period before income begins and a twenty-four month waiting period
before the recipient is eligible for public health insurance through Medicare.63
The benefits are based on prior earnings and are adjusted annually
for inflation. 64 The average monthly benefit for a disabled worker in November 2017 was $1173 .15. 65 These benefits may be offset if a worker is
66
receiving workers' compensation or other public disability benefits. In
addition to the disabled worker, dependents may get benefits as well, alt67
hough there are family maximums that cap the total. The average pay68
ments for workers and families are barely above the poverty level.
Eligibility for SSI is based on income and assets rather than previous
work history. There are federal provisions that govern what counts as
income and assets. 69 For example, SNAP benefits and shelter from private
nonprofits are not income 70 and a home, car, burial plots and life insurance
DISABILITY BENEFITS, supra note 46, at 2.
Id.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Id. at 4, 12.
63.
Moulta-Ali, supra note 45, at 2.
64.
Soc. SEC. ADMIN., MONTHLY STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT, Nov. 2017, tbl.2,
65.
https://www .ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/index.html?qs#table2 (last visited Apr. 12,
2018).
Moulta-Ali, supra note 45, at 2.
66.
Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 65, tbl. 2 (explaining that as of November 2017, average
67.
monthly benefit for spouses was $328.67 and for children, $358.53), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/index.html?qs#table2 (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
Paul O'Leary et al., Social Security Disability Insurance at Age 60: Does It Still Reflect
68.
Congress' Original Intent? (2015), available at https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/issuepapers/ip2015-01.html.
Soc. SEC. ADMIN., Understanding Supplemental Security Income SSI lncome-2018 Edi69.
tion, https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-income-ussi.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Soc. SEC.
ADMIN., SSI Income]; Soc. SEC. ADMIN., Understanding Supplemental Security Income SSI Resources - 2017 Edition, https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-resources-ussi.htm (last visited Apr. 12,
2018)[hereinafter Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SSI Resources].
Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SSI Resources, supra note 69.
70.
59.
60.
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worth less than $1,500 do not count in determining assets. 71 The asset
limit is $2,000 for an individual and $3,000 per couple. 72
The average monthly payment for federal SSI recipients age
eighteen to sixty-four is $564.18, well below the poverty level. 73 In addition, some states pay a supplement to federal SSI. 74
Obtaining an award of disability income can be a lengthy process,
especially if the initial application is denied and appeals are required. 75
The Social Security Administration has a Compassionate Allowances Program that provides benefits more quickly to individuals with conditions
that clearly meet the definition of disability. 76 "Compassionate Allowances allow Social Security to target the most obviously disabled individuals for allowances based on objective medical information that [it] can
obtain quickly." 77 A number of cancers are on the list of conditions identified as "obviously" disabling. 78 Individuals with these conditions get
expedited consideration of their applications for benefits. As described
by Social Security, the decisions are made in weeks rather than months or
years. 79 The Compassionate Allowances program has reduced the backlog of decisions. 80
Social Security also has a number of work incentive programs
71. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SSI Resources, supra note 69.
72. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SSI Resources, supra note 69.
73. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME RECIPIENTS: MONTHLY
STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT, Nov. 2017, tbl.3, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/index.html?qs - table3 (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
74. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., Understanding Supplemental Security Income SSI Benefits - 2018 Edition, https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-benefits-ussi.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2018) [hereinafter Soc. SEC.
ADMIN., SSI Benefits].
75. SeeMOLLYDAHL&NOAHMEYERSON,CONG.BUDGET OFFICE, SOC. SEC. DISABILITY
INS.: PARTICIPATION TRENDS AND THEIR FISCAL IMPLICATIONS 2, 3 (2010)
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/2l638?index=ll673 (describing the application and appeals process); Hannah Weinberger-Divack, Redefining Disability: Increasing Efficiency and Fairness in
SSDI, 21 ELDER L.J. 263, 273-75 (2013); David H. Autor & Mark Duggan, Supporting Work: A Proposal for Modernizing the U.S. Disability Insurance System 10-12 (CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 2010)
[hereinafter Autor & Duggan, Proposal for Modernizing] (describing process and average wait times
including two years and three months from application to ALJ decision, where 75% of earlier denials
are overturned); Matheny, supra note 52, at 381 (noting that over a million individuals have disability
determinations pending before ALJs and that the average waiting time for such a decision is 530
days).
76.
Soc. SEC. ADMIN., Compassionate Allowances FAQs, https://faq.ssa.gov/link/portal/34011/34019/Article/3716/What-are-compassionate-allowances (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
77.
Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Michael Boyd, Social Security's Compassionate Allowances: Innovative Initiative or Deceptive
Smokescreen,
30
J.
NAT'L
Ass'N
L.
JUD.
717,
748-49 (2010) (describing the program).
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designed to encourage individuals with disabilities to return to the workplace if possible. 81 The Ticket to Work program allows individuals to take
advantage of programs designed to facilitate working without immediately losing disability benefits or health insurance benefits. 82 This incentivizes individuals to try to return to work by removing the risks of benefit
loss that deter such efforts. 83 Evaluation of the program shows that it does
affect employment by recipients of disability income, but the impact is
limited. 84

2. State Disability Income
Five states, along with Puerto Rico, have public disability income
programs. 85 The first of these, in Rhode Island, was enacted in 1942,
while the latest, in Hawaii, was enacted in 1969. 86 While the number of
states is small, employers in these six jurisdictions employ more than one
quarter of the country's civilian workforce. 87 These programs provide
temporary disability benefits partially replacing wages of workers who are
unable to work as a result of non-work-related illness or injury. 88
These state income programs are funded by employers and employees. In California and Rhode Island, employees pay into the fund through

81.
See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., The Redhook: A Guide to Work Incentives,
https://www.ssa.gov/redbook/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
Soc. SEC. ADMIN., Ticket to Work Program Overview, TICKET OVERVIEW,
82.
https://www.ssa.gov/work/overview.html#&aO=l (last visited Apr 15., 2018).
83.
Individuals receiving SSDI or SSI can return to work for a trial period of nine months
without losing benefits. Id. They can continue Medicare eligibility for eight years after returning to
work and if their earnings dip below a specified amount, they are guaranteed three more years ofSSI
or SSDI. Id.
84.
GINA LIVERMORE ET AL., CTR. FOR STUDYING DISABILITY POLICY, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY OF THE SEVENTH TICKET TO WORK EVALUATION REPORT 21 (2013); Autor & Duggan,
Proposal for Modernizing, supra note 75, at 15 (showing very limited success of ticket to work program). See also Yonatan Ben-Shalom & Arif A. Mamun, Return to Work Outcomes Among Social
Security Disability Insurance Program Beneficiaries, 26 J. DISABILITY POLICY STUD. I 00, 100, 10305 (2015) (reviewing studies showing low rate of work among beneficiaries using various work incentive programs). For a success story of a cancer survivor who used the ticket to work program, see
Soc. SEC. ADMIN., Marty's Success Story, TICKET TO WORK, https://www.choosework.net/library/marty-success-story (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
85. John G. Kilgour, California's State Disability and Paid Family Leave Program With a
Review of Other State Actions, 43 COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV. 282, 282 (2011 ). The five states
are California, Hawaii, Rhode Island, New Jersey and New York. Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Jenna Stearns, The Effects ofPaid Maternity Leave: Evidence From Temporary Disability
Insurance, 43 J. HEALTH ECON. 85, 86 (2015).
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payroll deduction by their employers. 89 New Jersey benefits are funded
by both employers and employees, while New York and Hawaii benefits
are funded by employers, with cost-sharing with employees permitted. 90
Unlike unemployment compensation and workers' compensation, the insurance is not experience-rated so the number of employees collecting
benefits does not change the cost. 91
Eligibility for benefits varies by state but in none is it tied to work
for a particular employer. Instead, it is tied to work for any covered employer in the state during an eligibility period, similar to unemployment
insurance. 92 In each state the work requirement is far less than the eligibility requirement for Family Medical Leave Act leave. 93 All plans cover
private employers. 94 Only Hawaii requires government employees to participate in the plan, while the other states either provide disability benefits
directly to government employees or allow government employers to either provide benefits directly or to opt into the state plan. 95 In California,
89. Id. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE§ 2901 (2015); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 28-40-1 (2015).
Steams, supra note 88, at 86; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-46 (2015); N.Y. WORKERS'
90.
COMP. LAW§§ 209-210 (2015); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 392-43 (2015). Notably, research on mandated
benefits suggests that in actuality employees pay for such benefits through reduced wages even where
they are ostensibly employer-funded. See Patricia M. Anderson & Bruce D. Meyer, The Effects of
the Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax on Wages, Employment, Claims and Denials, 78 J. PUB.
EcON. 81, 95, 102 (2000) and authorities cited therein.
Steams, supra note 88, at 86.
91.
92. Id.
93. Id. California requires $300 in earnings from covered employment during the one year
base period, while Hawaii requires $400. Id. at 86 n.4; see also CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2652;
HAw. REV. STAT. § 392-25. New York requires only four consecutive weeks ofcovered employment,
while New Jersey requires twenty weeks of employment in covered employment with earnings of at
least $168 per week. Steams, supra note 88, at 86 n.4; see also N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW§§ 203,
209; N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 43:21-27; Wage Requirements - State Plan Employer, N.J. DEP'T OF LAB. &
WORKFORCE DEV., http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/tdi/empstate/sp_ emp_ wage_requirements.html
(last visited Apr. 12, 2018). Rhode Island requires earnings of 400 times the minimum wage during
the base period, with additional requirements for particular quarters of the base period. R.I. GEN.
LAws § 28-41-11. By way of contrast, the FMLA requires that the employee worked for the specific
employer for at least one year in total and worked at least 1250 hours in the last year. 29 U.S.C. §
2611(2)(A).
94. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FMLA (Family & Medical Leave), https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/benefits-leave/fmla (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
Steams, supra note 88, at 86 n.4; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 392-3 (defining employer
95.
as "any individual or type of organization, including the State, any of its political subdivisions, any
instrumentality of the State or its political subdivisions"); N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW§ 212(2) (stating "[n]otwithstanding the definition of 'employer' and 'employment' in section two hundred one of
this article, a public authority, a municipal corporation or a fire district or other political subdivision
may become a covered employer for the purpose of providing disability benefits under this article by
complying with the provisions of subdivision one of this section."); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 43:21-27(a)(2)
(stating "[a]ny governmental entity or instrumentality which is an employer under [N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 43:21-19) may ... elect to become a 'covered employer'"); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 28-39-3.1 (" ... a
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state employees represented by the Service Employees International Union have obtained the right to participate in the plan through collective
bargaining. 96 California also allows business owners and self-employed
individuals to opt in to the plan although they must pay into the plan for
two years before collecting benefits. 97
The non-taxable benefits replace fifty to sixty-six percent of the employee's average weekly wage up to a maximum set by each state. 98 As a
result of the maximums, the benefits for higher paid employees replace a
smaller percentage of their wages than for lower paid employees. The disability income is payable for a maximum of 26 weeks to one year, depending on the state. 99 California and Rhode Island also cover partial disability so long as the employee was fully disabled for at least seven
days. 100
Some states allow employers and employees to substitute private disability benefits for the state plan so long as the benefits are at least equivalent and the cost to the employee is no higher than the state plan. 101 In
California, the employer often pays for the private plan, although employees pay for the public plan. 102 The employer in California that chooses a
private plan must also pay a tax into the state plan which goes into a fund
that pays benefits to workers who are unemployed or employed in non-

governmental entity which is a political subdivision or instrumentality of a political subdivision, or
an instrumentality of more than one of them or any instrumentality of them and one or more other
political subdivisions, may become subject to those chapters by election.").
96.
Kilgour, supra note 85, at 283.
97.
Id.
98.
Steams, supra note 88, at 86-87. In 2018, California will increase the benefits for low
wage workers to 70% of average weekly wages for low wage workers and 60% for higher wage
workers. Sarah Jane Glynn, Alexandra L. Bradley, & Benjamin W. Veghte, Paid Family and Medical
Leave Programs: State Pathways And Design Options, NAT'L ACAD. OF SOCIAL INS. 12 (2017). California and Rhode Island adjust the maximum each year. Id.
99.
See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE§ 2653 (up to fifty-two weeks); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 392-23
(up to twenty-six weeks); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 43:21-39(b) (up to twenty-six weeks); N.Y. WORKERS'
COMP. LAW§ 205(a) (up to twenty-six weeks); R.I. GEN. LAWS§-§ 28-41-7 (up to thirty weeks).
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE§ 2627(b)(l); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 28-41-5(d).
100.
101.
Steams, supra note 88, at 86-87 (describing this option in New York and Hawaii); Kilgour,
supra note 85, at 283 (describing California's option for voluntary plans); Soc. SEC. ADMIN., Social
Security Programs in the United States, 47 (1997), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/sspus/tempdib.pdf (stating "In California, before a private insurance plan can be substituted for
the State plan, it must afford benefit rights greater than those under the State-operated plan. In Hawaii,
New Jersey, and Puerto Rico, private plan benefits must be at least as favorable as those under the
government plans. Hawaii permits deviation from statutory benefits if the aggregate benefits provided
under the private plan are actuarially equal or better."); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE§ 3254 (a); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 392-41 (a)(4), (a)(5), (d); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-32; N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW§
211.
102.
Kilgour, supra note 85, at 283,289.
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covered employment when the disability occurs. 103 As of 2010, 3.9% of
employees were covered by voluntary plans rather than the state plan, a
reduction from 4.9% in 2007. 104
Two additional jurisdictions, the state of Washington and the District
of Columbia, passed paid family and medical leave laws in 2017. 105 Both
programs will begin paying benefits in 2020. 106 The District of Columbia
program is funded by a tax on employers while Washington state's program is funded jointly by employers and employees. 107 Neither is comparable to the disability systems described above, however, as the District
of Columbia program offers only two weeks of paid leave for the worker's
own illness and Washington offers only 12 weeks of paid leave for that
purpose. 108 Based on the leave time, these laws are closer to paid leave
laws than temporary disability benefits, but their funding mechanism
makes them similar to the disability laws described above. Most paid
leave laws simply require the covered employers to provide paid leave. 109
Both new laws have income formulas which vary based on the pre-disability wages and are capped at $1000 per week. 110
The various state disability income programs have been classified
into four categories: 1) pure social insurance; 2) social insurance with limited private options; 3) state fund with private alternatives; and 4) an employer mandate. 111 Pure social insurance, such as the Rhode Island disability income program, requires employer and/or employee payments into
a government fund which pays benefits according to specified criteria. 112
103. Id. at 283. Taxes on employers that select private plans also pay for administrative costs of
the state. See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., Social Security Programs in the United States, 56 Soc. SEC. BULL.
39 (1993) (stating "California, New Jersey, New York, and Puerto Rico levy assessments on private
plans to cover the added administrative costs to the States of supervising these plans").
I 04. Kilgour, supra note 85, at 283. The author of the study attributes this reduction to the
recessionary economy. Id. However, the use of voluntary plans has dropped significantly since the
passage of the law, from as many as one half of workers covered in the early years to less than 5% in
recent years. Molly Weston Williamson, Structuring Paid Family and Medical Leave: Lessons from
Temporary Disability Insurance, 17 CONN. PuB. lNT. L. J. 1, 19-20 (2017). Holdovers from voluntary
plans in effect at the time of passage, increasing cost, and the addition of family leave benefits are
likely explanations for the reduction. Id. at 19-21. New Jersey's law is more favorable to private
plans than California's and while use of private plans has also declined there, it has done so far less
precipitously. Id. at 23-27 (describing differences in the two states' laws and decline in the use of
private plans, attributable to similar factors as California's, from about 60% to about 20%).
105. Glynn et al., supra note 98, at 9.
106. Id. at 9-10, 12.
107. Id. at 9-10.
108. Id. at 11-12.
109. Id. at 2-3.
110. Williamson, supra note 104, at 42-46.
111. Glynn et al., supra note 98, at 7, 13.
112. Id. at 7. This program format also has been described as a monopolistic state fund.
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Such a program provides universal disability income at a relatively low
cost per worker, pooling both risk and resources over a large number of
individuals, subsidizing those who need more extensive leave with the
contributions of those who need little or no leave. 113 A pure social insurance program with no private option is cheaper to administer and has more
predictable premium costs because of the large pool ofworkers. 114 Moreover, overhead expenses are typically low. 115
When private options are added, as in California and New Jersey,
regulatory costs increase because staff is required to insure that the private
options provide adequate protection. 116 Further if employers with low risk
populations of workers opt out of the state system, the state system might
experience increased costs. 117 Where the options are limited, however,
they may have little overall impact. 118
New York provides an example of a state fund with private options.119 New York built its system onto its Workers' Compensation program, reducing the otherwise costly development of the extensive regulatory structure needed to insure program enforcement. 120
The employer mandate, used in Hawaii, differs from social insurance
in several ways that might reduce the coverage of workers. Under a mandate system, the law could require the employer to provide insurance to
pay for disability income or allow the option to self-insure. 121 A mandate
is less portable than social insurance and would not cover workers who
become disabled between jobs. 122 Employers paying the benefits might
discourage workers from claiming them or more strictly interpret

Williamson, supra note 104, at 8.
Glynn et al., supra note 98, at 13.
113.
Id.
114.
Id. at 14.
115.
Id. at 14. Williamson categorizes this type of program as a default state fund; the state
116.
fund is the norm but private options complying with state requirements are an alternative. Williamson, supra note 104, at 13. State requirements can make it harder or easier to choose alternatives to
the default. Id. California makes it more difficult to use the private options, thereby encouraging
employers to use the default state fund, while New Jersey makes it comparatively easier to choose
private alternatives. Id.
Glynn et al., supra note 98, at 14.
117.
Id.
118.
119. Id. Williamson describes New York's law as an employer mandate with a strong state
fund as an option. Williamson, supra note I 04, at 8.
Glynn et al., supra note 98, at 14.
120.
Id. at 15.
121.
Id. The Hawaii statute, however, does establish a state fund to cover employees who are
122.
disabled while unemployed or whose employers fail to provide the required coverage. Williamson,
supra note I 04, at 36.
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eligibility criteria to disqualify them from collecting. 123 Finally, an employer mandate might discourage employers from hiring workers it deems
more likely to have temporary disabilities; older workers, for example, or
workers with preexisting conditions. 124
B. Private Disability Income
Private disability benefits come in two forms, employer plans and
individual plans. Employer plans, like other employee benefits, are offered by employers to their employees, while individual plans are purchased by individuals directly from insurers. 125
The Bureau of Labor Statistics maintains data on coverage of employer plans, 126 which may be provided by the employer to employees at
no cost to the employee or offered to the employees as an optional benefit
for purchase by the employee. 127 Forty-one percent of workers have access to short-term disability benefits with forty percent actually selecting
coverage. 128 Similarly, thirty-three percent have access to long-term disability benefits with thirty-two percent actually participating in the program.129 Not surprisingly, higher paid employees have greater access to
disability benefits than lower paid employees and employees oflarger employers are more likely to have access to such benefits than those of
smaller employers. 130
The low rate of coverage is driven by multiple factors. Insurers do
not aggressively market disability coverage. 131 Further, many employees

123.
Glynn et al., supra note 98, at 15. Of course, some have criticized social insurance systems, such as Social Security, as being too generous in awarding disability income. See WeinbergerDivack, supra note 75, at 265-66 (detailing criticisms of Administrative Law Judges who approve
too many applicants, as well as inconsistencies in the determination process); Jacob Bender, Tom
Between Two Masters: Flaws in the Social Security Disability Process, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 619 (2014)
(detailing a number of criticisms of the system).
124. Id. Such conduct would not be legal, but hiring discrimination is difficult to prove. See
BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 127-28.
125. Disability Insurance, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/benefits-other/disabilityins (last visited March 24, 2018).
126. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits Survey, Insurance Benefits: Access, Participation and Take-up Rates, March 2017 Table 16, https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2017/ownership/private/table 16a.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2018) [hereinafter "Employee Benefits Survey"].
127.
Kelly L. Knudson, California State Disability Insurance: Privatization Is the Answer to
Employee Woes, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 539, 545, 547 (2006).
128. Employee Benefits Survey, supra note 126.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131.
Allen, supra note 43, at 1345-46. Theorists offer two explanations for this phenomenon,
concerns about adverse selection and moral hazard. Id. (citing Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance
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do not appreciate the risk of disability and accordingly do not opt to purchase disability insurance when available. 132 Even those who do recognize the risk often do not have the opportunity to purchase affordable insurance.133
The two types of plans are regulated differently. Employer-provided
disability benefits plans, like other employer welfare benefit plans, are
covered by ERISA, the federal Employment Income Retirement Security
135 As might
Act. 134 Individual plans are regulated by state insurance law.
be expected, state law varies and additionally plans vary.
There are, however, commonalities among disability insurance
plans. Disability benefits commonly replace only part of an employee's
prior compensation. 136 Plans may cover short-term disabilities, long-term
disabilities or both and the plan will defme these terms. 137 Plans usually
distinguish between total disability and partial disability, defining those
terms as well. Total disability typically is based on the inability to do the
individual's own job or, like public disability benefits, the inability to do
any job for which the employee is qualified. 138 A plan might pay benefits
for one or the other or both depending on the timing. 139 Some plans may
cover partial disability also which is often defined as the inability to do all
job tasks, disability that causes a reduction in work time, or disability that
causes a reduction in income. 140 Some policies cover only disability from
accident not illness. 141
Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COUJM. L. REV. 75, 101 (1993)).
132. Id. at 1346.
133. Id. at 1346-47.
134. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)(A) (defining a welfare benefit plan as "any plan, fund, or program
which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer'' for the purpose of
providing "benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability ....").
Health Insurance Regulations, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
135.
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-insurance/health-insurance-regulations.aspx (last visited
Mar. 25, 2018).
Individual Disability Income Insurance, VERMONT DEP'T OF FIN. REG.,
136.
http://www.dfr.vermont.gov/insurance/insurance-consumer/individual-disability-income-insurance
(last visited Jan. 17, 2018) [hereinafter "VERMONT DEP'T"].
Id.
137.
Id.; FRANKLIN L. BEST, JR., I LIFE & HEALTH INS. L. § 15:1 (2d ed. 2014); Hammond v.
138.
Fidelity & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 428, 430-31 (7 th Cir. 1992).
For example, a plan might pay benefits for a specified time period if the individual cannot
139.
work at her own job and then after that only if the individual cannot work at any job. VERMONT
DEP'T, supra note 136.
Id.
140.
AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, GUIDE TO DISABILITY INCOME INSURANCE 12,
141.
https://www .ahip.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/PRO_ 113_ l 4_ Guide-to-DIat
available
2013_ F. pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
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Short-term disability plans are most commonly provided through
employers or other groups. 142 Individual short-term disability policies are
not common except for accidental injury policies. 143 The average premium
was $214 per year in 2013 and cancer was the sixth most common reason
for collecting short term disability benefits. 144
Long-term disability policies take over when short-term disability
policies reach their limits and are available on an individual or group basis. 145 The average premium for a group policy was $226 per year in
2013, 146 while premiums for an individual policy are far more expensive,
typically well over $1000 per year. 147 Cancer was the second leading
cause for collecting long-term benefits from a private plan in 2013. 148
Private disability benefits generally replace about 60% of pre-disability income at time of purchase. 149 Most contain an offset for other income such as SSDI or workers' compensation benefits. 150 They may have
waiting periods before payments start and will have a specified time period for payments which might be a number of years or until retirement. 151
The policy may contain an inflation adjustment or an option to purchase
additional insurance without a medical examination to keep up with increased cost ofliving. 152 In addition, there are a variety of provisions relating to continuation of the policy, ranging from non-cancelable, meaning the policy cannot be cancelled and the premium cannot be increased
except for failure to pay the premiums, to optionally renewable which allows the insurance company to decide each year whether to continue the
policy. 153 Depending on the choice offeatures, the policy will be more or
less expensive.
142. The Basics of Short-Term Disability Insurance, INSURE.COM, http://www.insure.com/articles/disabilityinsurance/short-terrn-disability.html (last updated Oct. 3, 2017).
143. Id.
144. Id.; see also Group Disability and Group Term Life Market Survey Summary of2013 Results, GEN. RE, http://media.genre.com/documents/surveylhgdgtmarketsuml404-en.pdf (last visited
Mar. 27, 2018).
145. The Basics ofLong-Term Disability Insurance, INSURE.COM, http://www.insure.com/disability-insurance/long-terrn-disability.html (last updated June 3, 2016).
146. Id.
147. Allen, supra note 43, at 1345 (citing average cost and providing example showing individual insurance purchased on the open market would cost 7.5 times the cost of group insurance
offered by an employer for the same employee).
148. The Basics ofLong-Term Disability Insurance, INSURE.COM, http://www.insure.com/disability-insurance/long-terrn-disability.html (last updated June 3, 2016).
149. AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS, supra note 141, at 12.
150. Id.
151. Id.at14.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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As for the definition of disability, it will depend on the plan's language and, if necessary, the court's construction of that language. Total
disability is generally construed as substantial disability and does not require complete inability to engage in the activities of daily life. 154 Private
plans are not required to follow the definition of disability in the Social
Security Act or any decision under that statute as to disability. 155 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, applying BRISA, upheld a decision by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals finding an insurer abused its discretion in
denying benefits to an employee who was awarded disability income under the Social Security Act. 156 The Court concluded that the Sixth Circuit
properly weighed the insurer's conflict of interest as a factor where the
company urged the employee to apply for SSDI and to represent to them
her complete inability to work and when she was successful in obtaining
retroactive payments, benefited from the offset to its own obligation. 157
The insurer then determined that she was able to work, ignoring the
agency's finding. 158 These facts, along with others, justified finding an
abuse of discretion. 159 In cases since, other courts have reached similar
decisions on similar facts, often where the insurer failed to address the
determination under the Social Security Act. 160 Thus, while not conclusive, the determination of disability under the Social Security Act will be
influential, particularly where there is an offset provision that benefits the
insurer who is also determining disability under the plan.
As in the case of public disability, the courts have construed disability under private plans to be limited by the fitness of the individual to the
job. 161 Thus, an individual will typically be found disabled if unable to
perform any job for which he or she is suited by education, training and
experience in which he or she can earn a living. 162
For occupational disability plans, the plan's definition of disability
will also be important. Some plans contain language limiting the definition of disability to circumstances where the participant cannot perform
Best, supra note 138, at §15.2.
154.
Best, supra note 138, at §15.2.
155.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 124 (2008).
156.
Id. at 118.
157.
158. Id.
Id.
159.
See, e.g., Raybourne v. Cigna Life Ins. Co. of New York, 700 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 2012);
160.
Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 679 (9th Cir. 2011); Schexnayder v.
Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 600 F.3d 465, 471 (5th Cir. 2010); Brown v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
301 F. App'x 772, 775-76 (10th Cir. 2008).
Best, supra note 13 8, at § 15: I.
161.
Best, supra note 138, at§ 15:1. See, e.g., Demirovic v. Building Serv. 32 B-J Pension
162.
Fund, 467 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 2006).
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any of the duties of the occupation. 163 Most courts interpret this language
as the inability to perform the significant duties of the job. 164 Where a
plan's language indicated that an applicant unable to "perform each of the
material duties" would qualify as disabled, however, the Fifth Circuit
found that the attorney applicant need only show that she could not perform one of the material duties of her job. 165
With the exception of government plans and church plans, 166 employer-provided disability benefits are regulated by BRISA. ERISA's
broad preemption provision largely ousts the states of any regulatory authority over employer-provided disability plans. 167 While there is an exception for plans "maintained solely for the purpose of complying with
applicable ... disability insurance laws", the Supreme Court has held that
BRISA preempts state efforts to force BRISA plans to include mandatory
state disability benefits. 168 The only option for the state is to force the
employer to establish a separate plan "solely" for the purpose of complying with state law. 169
ERISA's requirements for welfare benefit plans such as disability income plans are limited. Essentially, the employer has broad discretion in
designing its plan. BRISA requires the employer to follow its plan, 170 but
does not limit plan changes so long as notice is provided to participants. 171
Individuals may litigate application of the plan in order to claim benefits
denied, but first must exhaust reasonable BRISA-mandated claims review
procedures. 172 Detailed regulatory requirements mandate "full and fair
review." 173

163. ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW § 14-4 7 (3d
ed. Jeffrey Lewis et al., Eds. 2012) (hereinafter "EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW").
164. Id.
165. Lain v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 279 F.3d 337,345 (5 th Cir. 2002).
166. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003 (b) (1), (2).
167. ERISA, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. §1144(a) (stating that, with certain exceptions, ERISA
preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan.").
168. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
169. Id. at 108.
170. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § l 132(a) (authorizing civil actions to enforce the terms of an ERISA
plan).
171. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (stating that
"[e]mployers or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to
adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans"); ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a), §1024(b)(l) (establishing
that employers must notify beneficiaries of changes made to the plan); CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563
U.S. 421,425, 432-33 (2011) (remanding for a determination of the appropriate relief for CIGNA's
failure to give proper notice of changes to beneficiaries as required by ERISA).
172. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133; 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1.
173. For a description of the review requirements see EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note
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The courts review these cases de novo unless the plan provides discretionary authority to the decision-maker under the plan, in which case
the review is for abuse of discretion. 174 Not surprisingly, plan drafters
typically include language granting discretion in order to take advantage
of the more deferential review. 175 A recent study of ERISA benefits litigation found that disability claims were by far the most commonly litigated as compared to other benefit plans, although fewer employees are
covered by such plans. 176 Disability cases were more likely than other
cases to contain allegations that the plan administrator had a conflict of
interest. 177
In December 2016, the Department of Labor issued final regulations
regarding the processing of disability claims which expand on the requirements for full and fair review. 178 The new rules, which apply to claims
for benefits filed after January 1, 2018, were based on the Department's
concerns about conflicts of interest of those considering disability claims
and the motivation of plans to "aggressively dispute disability claims" to
contain costs. 179 The rules, designed to provide more protection to those
filing claims, require impartial, though not external, determination of
claims, 180 and require plans to provide more transparency to plan participants about the claims process and denials. 181 The plan participant must
be given an opportunity to respond to any new information or reasoning
on appeal. 182 And if the plan does not follow its own rules, the participant
will be deemed to have exhausted administrative remedies and can file
suit. 183 In addition, the court will not be required to defer to the plan's
determination if the rules are not followed. 184
Individual disability plans purchased in the market are governed by
state law, as are group plans not established or maintained by employers

163, at§§ 13-3-13-26.
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. IOI, 115 (1989).
174.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 163, at§ 13-46. For discussion of interpretation
175.
and application of such language, see id. at§§ 13-46- 13-54.
Sean M. Anderson, ERISA Benefits Litigation: An Empirical Picture, 28 ABA J. LAB. &
176.
EMP. L. 1, 6-7 (2012).
Id. at 11.
177.
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Claims Procedure for Plans Providing Disability Benefits, 81 FED.
178.
REG. 92316, Dec. 19, 2016, codified at 29 C.F.R. Part 2560.
Id. at Summary, 81 FED. REG. 92316, 92318.
179.
See 81 FED. REG. 92341, 29 C.F.R. §2560.503-l(b)(7).
180.
See 29 C.F.R. §2560.503-l(g)(l), (j) (1980), 29 C.F.R. §2560.503-1 (o) (2017).
181.
See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-l(h)(4)(i),(ii) (1980).
182.
See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(1)(1) (2017).
183.
See 29 C.F .R. § 2560.503-1 (1)(2) (2017).
184.
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or unions. 185 Each state establishes its own requirements for such plans. 186
C. Other Disability Income

Some employers, including many government employers, provide
long-term disability income through retirement plans. 187 Most require total and permanent disability in order to qualify for benefits although some
may pay benefits for a temporary disability. 188 If the plan is a defined
contribution plan rather than a defined benefit plan, 189 any payments taken
for disability will reduce the amount available to the plan participant in
retirement, which may exacerbate, or at least not solve, the financial problems resulting from disability. 190
There is a system of disability income for railroad employees initially
established in the 193Os as a separate system from Social Security. 191 Employees with a minimum ten years of service and total, permanent disability from any job are eligible for disability payments. 192 Railroad employees are also eligible for temporary disability payments from a system that
is combined with the railroad employees unemployment compensation
system and funded by employer contributions based on employee earnings.193
Disability benefits for veterans come in three main types: disability
compensation, dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC), and special monthly compensation (SMC). 194 Disability compensation can be

185. See 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-l(i) (1980) (exempting from ERISA voluntary plans offered by insurers to employees or union members without endorsement or contribution by the employer or union).
186. See, e.g., REV. CODE WASH.§ 48.21.050 (specifying required provisions for disability insurance); Dep't of Consumer and Bus. Serv., Or. Division of Fin. Reg., Standard Provisions/or Long
and Short Term Disability, Group or Individual, http://dfr.oregon.gov/rates-forms/Documents/2447.pdf.
187. Allen, supra note 43, at 1357.
188. Id.
189. Most retirement plans are now defined contribution plans rather than defined benefit plans.
See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits Survey, Retirement Benefits:
Access, Participation and Take-up Rates, Table 2, https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/20 l 6/ownership/private/table02a.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
190. Allen, supra note 43, at 1357-58.
191. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., Social Security Programs in the United States, 78 (1997),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/sspus/railroad.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
192. Id. at 80.
193. Id. at 82.
194. Compensation, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.benefits.va.gov/compensation (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
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195
Mental and
obtained by any Veteran who is at least 10% disabled.
physical disabilities qualify as long as they are attributable to active duty,
196
The benefit recipient
active duty for training, or inactive duty training.
197
evidence
Additionally,
dishonorably.
must not have been discharged
must show a relationship between the disability and an injury, disease, or
198
Cancer may be covevent that occurred while serving in the military.
199
Compensation is calcuered if the service connection is established.
lated in increments of ten percent. 200
DIC is paid to surviving spouses or surviving children of military
service members who were killed in the line of duty or because of an in201
To receive this benefit, the vetjury or disease incurred while serving.
duty, active duty for training,
active
eran must have either died while on
or inactive duty training; died from an injury or disease related to his or
her military service; or died from a non-service related injury or disease
while receiving or entitled to receive VA Compensation for a disability
rated as "totally disabling."202
SMC is paid to veterans, spouses, surviving spouses, or surviving
parents. 203 This benefit provides a higher rate of compensation that vet204
These cirerans and their families can obtain in special circumstances.
need for
the
or
hand,
cumstances include specific disabilities, like losing a
205
Compensation rates are calculated by a dethe aid of another person.
termination of how severe the disability is, starting from ten percent to
206
Additional amounts
one hundred percent, in ten percent increments.
can be obtained for severe disabilities, dependent spouses, children, or

Compensation: Disability Compensation, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
195.
http://www.benefits.va.gov/COMPENSATION/types-disability.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
Id.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
198.
See, e.g., Exposure to Contaminated Drinking Water at Camp Lejeune, U.S. DEP'T OF
199.
VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.benefits.va.gov/COMPENSATION/claims-postservice-exposurescarnp-lejeune-water.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2018) (discussing cancers presumed compensable for
veterans who served at Camp Lejeune, NC during certain time periods).
Id.
200.
Compensation: Dependency and Indemnity Compensation, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS
201.
http://www.benefits.va.gov/COMPENSATION/types-dependency_and_indemnity.asp
AFFAIRS,
(last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
Id.
202.
Compensation, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.benefits.va.gov/compen203.
sation/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
Id.
204.
Id.
205.
Compensation: Benefit Rates, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.bene206.
fits.va.gov/compensation/rates-index.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
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parents, or a severely disabled spouse. 207 If a veteran has multiple disabilities, the disabilities can be combined to obtain a combined disability
rating. 208 Combining disabilities is done by using the Combined Ratings
Table on the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs website, and then rounding the number up to the nearest ten percent. 209
Finally, if an employee can prove a sufficient causal connection between cancer and work, the employee will be entitled to workers' compensation benefits for cancer. 210 It is often difficult to prove that causation, however. 211 Many states have legal presumptions that certain
cancers were caused by work for employees in particular jobs. 212 The
burden is then on the employer to disprove causation. 213
Workers' compensation benefits, which are provided through mandatory insurance purchased by employers, include medical treatment, and
compensation for lost wages for temporary and permanent disability. 214
Workers compensation benefits also include compensation for partial disability, including payments to compensate for reduced wages caused by
the cancer. 215 Additionally, workers' compensation programs provide
both vocational and physical rehabilitation. 216 A comparison chart of the
various elements of the disability income programs described in this section is included in Appendix A.

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Cancer as Compensable Under Workers' Compensation
Acts, 19 A.LR. 4th 639, §2(a) (originally published in 1983).
211. Id.
212. Louisa Esola, Firefighter Cancer Presumption a Hot Issue/or Workers' Comp in 2017,
Bus.
Insider
(Jan.
18,
2017)
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20170118/NEWS08/912311446/Firefighter-cancer-presurnption-a-hot-issue-for-workers-compin-2017.
213. See, e.g., City of Long Beach v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 782, 793
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (imposing burden on employer to rebut presumption that police officer's cancer
arose out of and in the course of employment).
214. Virginia Reno et al., Social Security Bulletin, Workers' Compensation, Social Security
Disability Insurance, and the Offset: A Fact Sheet, Soc. SEC. ADMIN. (2003),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v65n4/v65n4p3.htrnl; see also 1-1 LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW§ 1.01 (2017).
215. See Reno, supra note 214; see also 6-90 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW§
80.03 (2017).
216. See 8-95 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW§ 95.01 (2017).
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V. CURRENT DISABILITY INCOME: WHAT WORKS FOR CANCER
SURVIVORS AND WHAT DOESN'T

Reviewing the data regarding work disability for cancer survivors
reveals that there is no universal pattern of disability because cancers are
different, work is different, and patient response to the disease and treatment is different. But cancer itself is ubiquitous and many individuals
will be affected by cancer during their work lives. A comprehensive disability income system would provide benefits for those temporarily disabled from work, both fully and partially, and for those permanently disabled from work, both fully and partially. Additionally, it would provide
both physical and vocational rehabilitation benefits and work incentives
as a part of a system designed to encourage return to work where possible.
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A. The Almost Universal System: Social Security
As evidenced by the review of disability income payments above, the
only almost universal disability program is the Social Security program. 217
For patients with advanced cancers, the program, whether through SSI or
SSDI, provides benefits to those individuals whose cancer will prevent
them from working at all for at least one year. 218 Its coverage is limited
to those who have a substantial work history, however, with the exception
of the very poor, so some individuals with cancer will remain outside the
system. 219 And while the adequacy of the payments in terms ofreplacement income can be debated, the payments do provide some support for
many individuals with cancer during long periods of complete inability to
work. 22 For the many cancer patients whose inability to work lasts less
than a year, 221 however, these programs provide no assistance. Nor do the
programs provide income to those who must work reduced hours as a result of cancer. 222 ·
The compassionate allowances process is a significant development
for many individuals with serious cancers, allowing them to receive their
payments much more quickly than would otherwise be the case given the
lengthy process. 223 From all accounts, the program enables these individuals to obtain income support when it is much needed. 224 For individuals
with terminal conditions, the payments may come while they are still living, alleviating the additional stress that would accompany financial hardship in the final months of their lives. 225 For those with lengthy treatment
and recovery, the payments will facilitate better compliance with treatment and also relieve stress, both of which will assist in recovery. 226 Nevertheless for those whose conditions do not meet the requirements for
compassionate allowances, the delays in determination will cause

°

217. Of course, some individuals will not be eligible for Social Security income if they have
not earned sufficient work credits and are not sufficiently indigent. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. Also, some public employees are not covered by the system and railroad employees
have their own similar system which, unlike Social Security, includes coverage for temporary disability.
218. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 59-63, 69-72 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 56 and accompanying text
223. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
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significant financial hardship.
The Social Security program provides incentives designed to help
individuals return to the workforce. 227 These incentives are certainly beneficial efforts but for many cancer survivors, eligibility will be an issue.
If the cancer does not completely disable them from any work for at least
a year, they will not obtain disability income under the program and thus
228
These prowill not be able to take advantage of the work incentives.
grams are only for the most seriously disabled who are the least likely to
recover enough to return to employment. Additionally, evaluations suggest that the programs do not return significant numbers of individuals to
work, perhaps because of their structure. 229
Thus, the one nearly universal system has substantial gaps in protection, leaving those with temporary or partial disability completely without
protection.

B. Temporary or Partial Disability and Return to Work
Individuals with disability of less than one year will have disability
income only if they live in one of the five states (or Puerto Rico) with
230
government programs and meet the requirements of those programs, or
have disability insurance through their employer or through a private plan.
Railroad employees, 231 veterans, employees whose cancer can be attributed to their job, and some employees of state and local government
also have temporary disability coverage. 232 Paid leave laws are inadequate for virtually all cancers as they typically require only a few days of
leave each year. 233
Slightly over a third of employees have short-term disability coverage while about one-third have long-term coverage. 234 Typically, it is
higher-paid employees, those less likely to need the income, that have
See REDBOOK, supra note 81, at 1.
227.
See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
228.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
229.
Soc. SEC. ADMIN., Social Insurance Programs 44, available at https://www.ssa.gov/pol230.
icy/docs/progdesc/sspus/tempdib.pdf.
Id.
231.
Id.
232.
See Hodges, supra note 1, at 1078-79. The exception is the newly enacted law in the state
233.
of Washington, which will provide up to twelve weeks of paid leave beginning in 2020. See supra
notes 105-10 and accompanying text. While that will not be adequate for treatment for many cancers,
it is significantly better than other paid leave laws.
Supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. Long-term coverage, depending on the plan
234.
may cover disabilities that are too short to qualify for Social Security benefits, i.e., lasting less than
one year. See supra note 137, 154-155 and accompanying text.
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access to it. 235
Employers are free to change their plans at will and litigation over
eligibility is common, with determinations as to disability frequently
made by individuals with conflicts of interest. Further individually purchased plans are expensive, out of the reach of many.
In addition, depending on the definition of disability, the plan,
whether provided by the employer or purchased by the individual, may
not pay. 236 If the employee is disabled from her own job but not all jobs,
a plan requiring total disability from any job will not pay. 237 Imagine the
prospective employer response to an applicant who explains that she is
temporarily disabled from doing her previous job as a result of cancer
treatment. A job offer is highly unlikely and proof of discrimination will
be difficult. 238
Partial disability coverage is even rarer. While veterans can obtain
partial disability, many private plans require total disability, as do the public plans in three states. Yet for many cancer patients, some residual disability impacts their ability to work fulltime or their ability to work in
particular jobs long after treatment ends.
With the exception of Social Security, none of the public disability
programs are structured to provide any rehabilitation or incentive to attempt return to work. And the Social Security return to work program has
had limited success. Given the importance of work to cancer survivors
and the evidence that suggests that many can and do return to work, such
a program will be an important element of any disability program for cancer survivors.
VI. MAKING DISABILITY INCOME WORK FOR CANCER SURVIVORS

A. Uniting the Patchwork
As is evident from the above discussion, disability income is a patchwork of private and public systems, without comprehensive coverage for
temporary and permanent as well as partial and total disability or programs that promote and assist in efforts to return to work. How then to
modernize the disability income system in the United States so that it will
work for cancer survivors, as well as other individuals with disabilities?
The ideal solution is one comprehensive system that includes all of
235.
236.
237.
238.

Supra note 130 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
See Hodges, supra note 1, at 1075-76.
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the necessary elements. Workers' compensation systems provide a
model. They provide coverage for total and partial disability, temporary
and permanent disability and include physical and vocational rehabilitation programs to assist employees to return to work. 239 To build a similar
system, it would make sense to start with the one existing comprehensive
program, Social Security. While amending Social Security to provide additional income for individuals with disabilities seems politically unlikely, 240 it is worth considering what a modernization of the program
might look like. The program is faced with increasing and perhaps unsustainable costs, partly as a result of disability benefits. 241 And cancer is the
fourth largest category of disability awards. 242 But some of these costs
might be mitigated by an effective program that returned individuals with
disabilities to work.
Evidence from both the United States and other developed countries
indicates that once employees have received disability income for a few
months, they rarely return to work. 243 Considering this fact, David Autor
and Mark Duggan have proposed modifications to the disability income
system designed to focus on the front end, when employees with disability
244
Their prolimitations are considering whether to continue working.
posal would provide private disability insurance to workers through their
employers at a relatively modest cost. 245 The insurance would provide
partial disability income for up to two years, replacing sixty percent of

See 6-80 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW§ 80.03(1) (2017); 8-95 LARSON'S
239.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW§ 95.0lD (2017).
Social Security has been called the third rail of politics. William Satire, Third Rail, N.Y.
240.
TIMES MAG. (Feb. 18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/J8/m agazine/18wwlnsafire.t.html.
Further, while there is some political pressure to expand Social Security, the predominant concern
seems to be shoring up the system financially and even that is politically problematic. Russ Wiles,
Changes may be ahead for Social Security, observers say, USA TODAY (Oct. 23, 2017 12:08 PM),
https ://www.usatoday.com/ story/money/personalfinance/201 7I 10/2 3/changes-may-ahead-social-security-observers-say/790666001.
Richard V. Burkhauser et al., Disability Benefit Growth and Disability Reform in the U.S.:
241.
Lessons from Other OECD Nations, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, 2 (Dec. 13, 2013),
http://www.frbsf.org/economic-resear ch/files/wp20l3-40.pdf (stating that since 2009 the Disability
Income program has been paying out more than it is taking in). See also Autor & Duggan, Proposal
for Modernizing, supra note 75, at 2 (noting that expenditures for disability have increased from 10%
to 18% of Social Security payments); David H. Autor & Mark Duggan, The Growth in the Social
Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 71 (2006) [hereinafter
Autor & Duggan, A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding] (describing increase in individuals collecting disability
over time and explanations for the increase).
Autor & Duggan, A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding, supra note 241, at 79.
242.
Burkhauser et al., supra note 241, at 40.
243.
Autor & Duggan, Proposal for Modernizing, supra note 75, at 5.
244.
Id. at 6, 23.
245.
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wages up to a maximum of $2,500 per month. 246 In addition, the program
would provide vocational rehabilitation and accommodations required by
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") to enable the employee to
continue working. 247 At the conclusion of the two year period workers
unable to work could apply for SSDI. 248 The program would not change
for employees with conditions that qualify for Compassionate Allowances, who could immediately apply for SSDI. 249
The authors of the proposal envision that the disability insurance
would be obtained and paid for by the employer. 250 The employer could
charge employees up to forty percent of the cost, which they estimate,
based on the current costs of private disability insurance, to be about
twenty dollars per month. 251 For larger employers, the insurance would
be experience-rated, providing an incentive to the employer to accommodate the employee to enable the employee to continue to work. 252 Experience ratings for smaller employers would be industry, rather than employer, based. 253 Employers that currently provide private disability
insurance would not be required to participate, and would be free to offer
more generous coverage to their workers. 254
This proposal would address many of the needs of cancer survivors.
First, it would provide some income for two years for those who are unable to work or unable to work fulltime. 255 Further, the eligibility criteria
would be less stringent so individuals unable to work for less than twelve
months would be entitled to disability income. 256 Because the program
payments commence ninety days after disability onset, the program
avoids the long delays that accompany qualification for SSDI and SSI applicants who do not have a condition that qualifies for a Compassionate
Allowance. 257 Employers are free to offer short-term disability coverage
246. Id. at 6.
247. Id. The ADA requires the employer to make reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals with disabilities unless the employer can show that the accommodation causes undue hardship. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
248. Autor & Duggan, Proposal/or Modernizing, supra note 75, at 7.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 23. The experience of other countries that have reformed their disability systems
shows the importance of incentivizing employers to accommodate and rehabilitate workers. Burkhauser et al., supra note 241, at 38-40. Currently in the U.S., employers bear none of the direct cost
of payments if employees move into the SSDI system. Id. at 39.
253. Id. at 7.
254. Id. at 7, 14.
255. Id. at 7.
256. Id. at 18.
257. Id. at 6, 18.
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258
This early income support is
for the ninety-day waiting period as well.
particularly important for those who do not have employer-provided or
state-provided disability insurance. Survivors without disability insurance are more likely to be lower income workers, who are also less likely
259
to remain employed during and after treatment. This quick income support will allay some of the financial hardship and accompanying stress,
while also employing interventions to keep these individuals in the workforce.
The second benefit of the program for cancer survivors is the incentive for employers to accommodate those workers disabled by cancer or
260
its residual effects and provide them with vocational rehabilitation. The
program thus dovetails with the accommodation requirements of the
261
The private insurer would assist the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
employer with implementation of accommodations and pay the cost of
those accommodations, making compliance with the ADA requirements
more likely. 262 Also vocational rehabilitation might improve the chances
of remaining employed in the existing job or another more suited to current limitations.
Further, because the disability insurance would remain in effect for
a year post-termination, the employer would have a reduced incentive to
263
Enabling a worker with cancer to keep his
terminate a disabled worker.
or her job allows continuation of coverage by the same health insurance
plan. Maintenance of insurance avoids any treatment effects that may
arise from changing plans, such as a need to change providers or a delay
in obtaining new coverage. 264 Further if opponents of the Affordable Care
Act are successful in eliminating or severely damaging it, staying employed may provide the difference between health insurance coverage and
none. 265 At least under current law, even those who obtain SSDI are not
eligible for Medicare for the first twenty-four months that they receive
income payments. 266 Only those who are both asset and income poor will

Id. at 18.
258.
See supra notes 13-17, 130-133 and accompanying text. The exception, of course, is work259.
ers in states with public disability income laws.
Autor & Duggan, Proposal for Modernizing, supra note 75, at 6,18-19.
260.
See supra note 24 7 and accompanying text.
261.
Autor & Duggan, Proposal for Modernizing, supra note 75, at 17.
262.

Id.
263.
Id. at 12, 17.
264.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPEALING THE INDNIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATE: AN
265.
UPDATED ESTIMATE (2017) (stating estimate of the Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation that if a repeal of the ACA began in 2019, four million fewer people would have
health insurance in 2019 and thirteen million fewer would have health insurance by 2027).
42 u.s.c. § 426(f) (2018).
266.
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have insurance through Medicaid. 267
A third benefit for cancer survivors arises from the fact that many of
the residual limitations involve conditions like cognitive limitations, depression, and fatigue. 268 As the report notes, these conditions are among
the most difficult to assess and adjudicate under current disability law. 269
Thus, awards of benefits for these conditions are long-delayed, exacerbating the financial impact of cancer. 270 Yet these conditions may, in some
cases, be easily accommodated. 271 This program has the advantage of encouraging both employers and employees to maintain the employment relationship, with accommodations that improve the prospects for longterm employment. Under the existing program, both parties have an incentive to end the relationship, for employees cannot get benefits if they
are able to work at all and employers bear the cost of accommodations. 272
Although the program only lasts for two years and some cancer survivors have residual limitations for longer, if the employer can see the
benefit of accommodation, it may continue to accommodate beyond the
requisite two years and indeed the ADA may require it. 273 Additionally,
the program would allow insurers to provide a longer income period, for
example, if employees are able to work part-time and thus collect a lower
monthly income payment. 274 Requiring, rather than merely allowing extension of reduced income payments for workers who can work part-time
would be even better. Further, in some cases, vocational rehabilitation
may enable a job change that better suits the employee's new limitations.275 Individuals who cannot work with a reasonable accommodation

267. Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/eligibility (last visited
Jan. 15, 2018); Medicaid Expansion & What It Means for You, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES https://www.healthcare.gov/medicaid-chip/medicaid-expansion-and-you (last visited Jan.
15, 2018); See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Where Are States Today? Medicaid and CHIP
Eligibility Levels for Children, Pregnant Women, and Adults, KFF (Jan. 19, 2017)
https://www.lcff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/where-are-states-today-medicaid-and-chip ("32 states cover
parents and other adults with incomes up to 138% FPL [Federal Poverty Level] in Medicaid [and]. ..
three states (AK, DC, and CT) extend eligibility for parents and/or other adults to levels higher than
138% FPL").
268. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
269. See Autor & Duggan, Proposal for Modernizing, supra note 75, at 12.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See idat I, 5, 12, 13, 17.
273. Merely providing the accommodation for a period of time does not conclusively establish
that it is reasonable, but it will be evidence to support that conclusion. See Vande Zande v. Wis.
Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 542, 545-46 (7th Cir.1995).
274. See Autor & Duggan, Proposal for Modernizing, supra note 75, at 21, 22.
275. See id. at 6, 17, 18, 20.
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can move to permanent SSDI. 276
The program would reduce reliance on private disability insurance,
although employees could still purchase such insurance and employers
could still provide additional coverage. Some employers might desire to
do so to recruit and retain employees. Combining the program with expanded paid leave, which would precede any period of disability income,
would also ease financial hardship for many survivors.
Because of the financial challenges in the federal disability program,
the time may be right for a proposal for change to have the chance for
success, particularly one that aims to encourage retention of employment
for those individuals who are able to return to work or continue to work
after some period of total or partial disability. The Autor and Duggan
proposal fits best with the needs of cancer survivors, although there are
others. One proposal recommends experience rating for SSDI payments
to encourage employers to accommodate and rehabilitate employees, as
277
well as incentivizing them to provide short term disability insurance.
Management incentives, however, seem less likely than government requirements to provide the necessary benefits to those who need them, particularly for lower wage workers who are easily replaced. Liebman and
Smalligan propose a variety of demonstration projects to test innovations. 278 Of those they recommend, the one most helpful to cancer survivors is Autor and Duggan' s proposal. As suggested, a pilot program could
help demonstrate the benefits of the proposed changes.
Given the challenges of Social Security reform, it is worth considering other alternatives that would benefit cancer survivors. The second
best option is expansion of state public disability benefits.
B. A Partial Fix
If a comprehensive Social Security revision along the lines described
above is not politically feasible, an alternative would be an expansion of
state temporary disability programs similar to those currently existing in
five states. 279 This could be done through a social insurance program with
See id. at 7, 24.
276.
See Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly, Social Security Disability Insurance: Time
277.
for A Fundamental Change, 31 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 454,459 (2012).
See Jeffrey B. Liebman & Jack A. Smalligan, Proposal 4: An Evidence-Based Path to
278.
Disability Insurance Reform, THE HAMILTON PROJECT (2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/u loads/2016/06/THP_l 5WaysFedBudget_prop4.p df.
Professor Aleta Allen advocates such expansion to assist with the problem of medical
279.
bankruptcies. Allen, supra note 43, at 1361. Of course, these programs are not perfect and have been
subject to criticism for administrative inefficiency and inadequacy of benefits. See, e.g., Knudson,
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a state administered fund, such as Rhode Island uses, 280 a program that
allows private alternatives like California and New Jersey, 281 or a mandate
to employers to purchase private insurance with a state reserve fund for
those who are unemployed at the time of disability, similar to Hawaii. 282
None of these existing programs cover a time period as extensive as
the proposed Social Security revision and any new program that is politically feasible would likely be similar. But a temporary disability program
with payments for six months to a year would mitigate some of the fmancial hardship that accompanies cancer treatment. Ideally the program
should provide job protection for employees accessing it so that those able
to return to work at the expiration of disability could return to their prior
employment. No state law currently contains such protection, but the
shorter time period of disability coverage makes job protection more feasible.283 Given the challenges of proving disability discrimination in hiring,284 and the tendency for employees on disability rolls to remain on
disability rolls, 285 providing job protection is one of the best ways to keep
employees in the workforce. And keeping employees in the workforce if
possible is beneficial to the employees who will earn more than on disability, as well society, which will benefit from their productivity, their increased spending, and the fact that they are not drawing on disability
funds.
Another way to keep employees in the workforce is to ensure that the
temporary disability programs include vocational rehabilitation. Private
disability insurance typically includes coverage for vocational rehabilitation.286 Vocational rehabilitation, which includes services such as aptitude testing, counseling, assistive technology and skills training, would
help employees return to prior jobs or, if unable to work in the prior position, obtain a new one. 287
Like California and Rhode Island, 288 the law should cover partial disability that follows total disability, as many cancer survivors have residual

supra note 127, at 549-51.
280. Allen, supra note 43, at 1368.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1362.
283. The law could provide exceptions for very small employers or employers with jobs that are
difficult to fill on a temporary basis. The law could also permit permanent replacement of employees
who obtain permanent disability benefits from another source.
284. BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 127-28.
285.
See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
286.
Autor & Duggan, Proposal/or Modernizing, supra note 75, at 18.
287.
Id. at 18-20.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
288.
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partial disability. Workers with partial disability should be eligible for
reduced benefits. Covering partial disability is another vehicle for encouraging employees to remain in the workforce.
And finally, the maximum length of eligibility, and the amount of
income provided should be set to provide adequate support. California's
fifty-two-week eligibility period would cover many cancer survivors. 289
New Jersey's wage replacement rate of two-thirds of the individual's average weekly wage290 is similar to many other disability systems, designed
to provide reduced income to encourage return to work but sufficient for
basic needs. California's law provides for a higher wage replacement rate
for lower wage workers, which is a provision worth emulating to help
lower income workers cover basic needs. 291 The maximum income payment should be similar to Rhode Island's, which is eighty-five percent of
the state's average weekly wage,292 or California's, which is approximately one hundred percent of the state's average weekly wage. 293
The major challenge for implementing this proposal is funding. Several of the existing state programs were initially funded using mechanisms
not currently available. Rhode Island, California, and New Jersey established their programs at a time when employees in those states contributed
to unemployment insurance. 294 Each state substituted contributions to the
state's disability fund for the employee contributions to the unemployment insurance fund and pursuant to a federal law enacted in 1947, transferred prior employee contributions from the unemployment trust fund to
the disability trust fund. 295 Thus the state funds were able to pay out benefits relatively soon after establishment of the program. This existing
source of funding from employees made the creation of the programs
more politically palatable.296 There is no similar funding mechanism today. Indeed, unemployment insurance funds tend to be underfunded because of legislators' disincentives to allocate money to such funds when
the economy is strong in order to be prepared when the economy weakens

289.
Williamson, supra note 104, at 18.
290.
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 43:21-40 (West).
291.
See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE§ 2655(d)(2). Effective in 2018, lower wage workers receive
70% of pre-disability income while higher wage workers received 60%. Id.
292.
R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 28-41-5(a)(l). New York's limit of$170 per week is far too low. Williamson, supra note I 04, at 35.
293.
Williamson, supra note 104, at 35.
294.
Id. at 10-11, 15-16, 24.
295.
Id.
296.
Id. at 10, 14-15, 24. New Jersey also required employer contributions, feasible at the time
because of other changes to the unemployment insurance program which balanced out the cost. Id.
at 24.
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and unemployment is higher. 297 The existing incentives in the unemployment insurance system encourage benefit reductions rather than increased
funding. 29s
A system reliant on a state fund would have to delay income payments to allow for time to build up the fund through employee and/or employer contributions, 299 unless, as is unlikely, the state appropriated initial
funding. Existing systems vary in terms of funding sources, but with a
new system, funding should be shared between employers and employees
or allocated to employers who have greater resources in most cases and
benefit from the insurance. 300
An insurance mandate avoids some of the funding issues by requiring employers to purchase insurance instead of, or in addition to, establishing a state fund. 301 The cost is not substantial, and allowing employers
to charge part of the cost to employees might reduce some of the organized
political opposition. A mandate system would not cover workers between
jobs, however, unless, like Hawaii and New York, the state establishes a
fund for such a purpose. 302
Any system that requires or allows private insurance, however, imposes an administrative cost of enforcement to insure compliance. 303 Effective enforcement with substantial fines and penalties for failure to

Brian D. Galle, How to Save Unemployment Insurance 20-25 (August 21, 2017), ARiz.
297.
ST. L.J., (forthcoming), available at SSRN: https://ssm.com/abstract=3023430.
298. Id. at 4.
299. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (describing newly enacted paid leave laws
with payments beginning in 2020).
Allen, supra note 43, at 1367-68.
300.
As evidenced by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, however, insurance man301.
dates can be controversial. Id. at 1369.
These funds also pay benefits to employees whose employer fails to carry insurance. Wil302.
liamson, supra note 104, at 36. In addition to substantial fines and penalties, New York law allows
the state to seek reimbursement for benefits paid to employees if the employer fails to carry insurance.
Id. at 36. Hawaii law does not contain similar protections or enforcement mechanisms. Id. at 36-37.
New York established this state fund through a temporary payroll deduction for employees and continues to support it with periodic assessments on insurers. Id. at 33.
See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. Professor Allen suggests that using a state
303.
fund insures better quality control in claim processing as well. Allen, supra note 43, at 1368-69.
Knudson, in contrast, argues that monitoring compliance with a mandate could be easily handled by
state insurance regulators and would be further enhanced by employee monitoring based on their selfinterest. Knudson, supra note 127, at 553-54. Relying on employee monitoring, however, runs the
risk that the most vulnerable workers will be left out as they are unlikely to blow the whistle on their
employer. Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for
Worker Claims Making, 35 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 561, 568-69, 582-91(2010). Professor Gleeson
found through interviews of immigrant workers in northern California and Texas that these workers
chose not to report instances of discrimination for multiple reasons, including avoiding problems with
their employers and the lack of knowledge legal protections extended to them. Id.
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maintain insurance, like the New York law, 304 would be an essential component of a successful system. The more effective the enforcement, the
greater the enforcement cost, although significant fines and/or a small tax
on employers or insurers could fund the enforcement cost. 305
Building on existing systems could also reduce the cost. While the
early state disability systems were modeled on unemployment insurance,
the unemployment insurance administrative apparatus cannot be used to
administer other laws absent a change in federal law. 306 New York's disability law is administered by its workers' compensation agency, 307 a
model that might work for other states as well. Workers' compensation
laws, like disability laws, require a determination of whether an injury or
medical condition is partially or totally disabling, as well as whether the
disability is temporary or permanent. 308 They also impose an insurance
mandate on employers. 309 The systems vary so each state would have to
determine whether the existing system could be used effectively for disabling non-work-related injuries and illnesses. 310 Where possible, however, adding administration of the new law to the existing agency with
similar responsibilities would reduce costs.
An insurance mandate has other implications. Where the employer
bears the cost, as in an insurance mandate, the employer might be inclined
to discourage collection of benefits or discriminate in hiring against individuals perceived to be more likely to qualify for such benefits in the future. 311 At the same time, however, the employer and insurer might have
a greater incentive to accommodate the employee and provide rehabilitative services in order to accelerate a return to work. 312 Additionally using
a mandate would permit employers to purchase insurance with a longer
period of benefits if they chose.
States might vary in how they meet the funding challenges of
Williamson, supra note 104, at 33-34.
304.
See supra note 103.
305.
Williamson, supra note 104, at 9-10, 14-15, 21-22, 48-49.
306.
307. Id. at 33.
Id. at 32-33.
308.
309. Id. at 32.
Williamson suggests that states use this model to provide for paid family and medical
310.
leave. Id. at 50-57.
311. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
312. Employers may get a premium reduction if employees return to work. Knudson, supra
note 127, at 558-59. See also Jeffrey Smith, 3 things to consider when implementing a disability
management program, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS, Jan. 2, 2018, https://www.benefitnews.com/opinion/3things-to-consider-when-implementing-a-disability-management-program, (noting that many disability insurers have consultants and experts to work with employers to help with accommodations and
support to help employees with disabilities remain productively at work).
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establishing a program. But whether a mandate alone, an exclusive state
fund, or a state fund with private options, the program should contain the
essential elements set forth above and if there are private alternatives, an
adequate enforcement mechanism. While mandatory state disability insurance will not fill all the gaps in the current system, it would provide
substantial added protection for cancer survivors with disabilities lasting
less than a year.
C. Remaining Gaps

Neither of these two proposals resolves all of the issues facing cancer
survivors with disability. Neither addresses the adequacy of disability income and survivors may still have financial problems depending on their
own particular financial situation. In addition, the proposals do not deal
with problems within the systems, such delays in processing applications,
insurers who act in bad faith or recklessly, 313 or the difficulty of establishing disability on the basis of some of the common conditions of cancer
survivors such as fatigue and cognitive limitations. 314 These issues need
to be addressed as well to improve the disability system for cancer survivors.
Nevertheless, each proposal would be a significant improvement
over the current system, which leaves many cancer survivors without income during their treatment and recovery, leading to financial difficulties
that exacerbate health issues. Given the current trend of expanding paid
leave, the disability income systems will need to be integrated with available paid leave. Paid leave is preferable as it typically provides 100 percent of pre-cancer income, but it is unlikely that paid leave will expand to
cover the time away from work that many need for treatment and recovery. Thus, a combination of expanded paid leave and effective disability
income, along with accommodations for disabilities, will be necessary to
313. See, e.g., Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 678 (9th Cir. 2011)
(finding plan's explanation of denial of benefits "shifting," "inconsistent," and "illogical") and further
stating that "failing to pay out money owed based on a false statement of reasons for denying is
cheating, every bit as much as making a false claim."); Lauder v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 76 Fed.
App'x 348, 350 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding insurer acted in bad faith and took frivolous positions in
litigation); Curtin v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 298 F. Supp. 2d 149, 159 (D. Me. 2004) (awarding
the plaintiff attorney's fees as a deterrent because the insurance company acted with "a low level of
care to avoid improper denial of claims at great human expense.").
314. See, e.g., Salomaa, 642 F.3d at 678 (overturning plan's denial of plaintiff's disability claim
based on chronic fatigue syndrome, finding plan abused its discretion but noting that "[ o]ne can understand the frustration of disability plan administrators with claims based on such diseases as chronic
fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia. Absence of objective proof through x-rays or blood tests of the
existence or nonexistence of the disease creates a risk of false claims.").
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relieve the financial stress of cancer.
VII. CONCLUSION

While the divided political climate in the United States creates little
hope for major change, cancer is so ubiquitous that it affects nearly everyone, either directly or through a close friend or family member. That
effect might create a vehicle that would generate support for modernizing
the disability income system in the United States. Modernization would
benefit not only cancer survivors, but also others who suffer from loss of
income as a result of temporary or permanent disability.
Reducing financial stress would increase prospects for treatment
compliance and recovery, while improving the lives of cancer survivors
and their families. A modern disability income system also might reduce
some of the cost of cancer for society by enabling some survivors to remain in or return to the workforce. Unfortunately, medical developments,
while promising, are unlikely to eliminate cancer in the near future. As a
result, almost everyone will be impacted by the disease. Improvements in
treatment, medical, legal and financial, will bring widespread benefits to
Americans with cancer and their families.
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Appendix A*
*The data in the chart comes from the article ifthere is no citation in the chart.
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